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Regional Economic Community Building amidst 
Rising Protectionism and Economic Nationalism in 
ASEAN 
 
Alexander Chandra  The Habibie Center 
 
Abstract 
Despite its ambitious ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) project, protectionism, 
and economic nationalism are on the rise in ASEAN. Protectionism, however, is not 
new to Southeast Asia, with governments across the region employing an inward-
looking economic policy when they enjoy economic stability, and pursuing economic 
reform when confronted with major economic challenges. Unfortunately, embryonic 
industries will always exist in the region, and governments will find excuses to 
safeguard their existence. Drawing on the Murdoch School of critical political economy 
approach, this article argues that the inclination towards protectionism in ASEAN be 
primarily rooted in the domestic political economy of member states. Apart from 
bringing about domestic regulatory changes, major economic liberalisation initiatives 
of ASEAN, such as AFTA and the AEC, significantly redistribute power and 
resources, and ignite struggles between competing for domestic economic influences, 
many of which are in favour of government’s protection. Whilst existing technical 
initiatives to address protectionism are useful, major crises that encourage structural 
adjustments in all ASEAN Member States might be needed to overcome protectionist 
inclinations in the region. 




The long-awaited ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) was finally launched 
on 1st January 2016. Despite the success of 
the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in officially launching 
its most ambitious project to date, 
scepticisms linger over the viability of the  
Association’s economic integration 
project. The rise of protectionism, as an 
expression of economic nationalism, in 
particular, has been seen by many experts 
and practitioners alike as a key hindrance 
to ASEAN’s effort to deepen its economic 
integration project. While senior officials 
of ASEAN Member States (AMS) have 
consistently reiterated their countries’ 
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commitments towards the AEC; a 
significant contrast is depicted on the 
ground. Despite significant achievement 
in reducing tariff barriers over the past 
decade, for instance, non-tariff measures 
(NTMs)/non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remain 
rampant across the region. Though the 
incidence of NTMs in ASEAN is relatively 
moderate in comparison with other 
regions of the world (Cadot et al., 2013: 
12), these protective measures will prove 
to be major stumbling blocks for ASEAN 
to attain its 2025 Economic Vision.1 
Domestically in each AMS, 
protectionist push against the AEC is 
mounting. Shortly prior and during the 
immediate aftermath of the AEC 
launching, public debate on the subject 
was, unsurprisingly, becoming more 
common. While many express their 
excitement about this ambitious regional 
economic integration project, others 
remain sceptical, highlighting their 
countries’ unpreparedness to face, inter 
alia, increasing competition as a result of 
the AEC. In Indonesia, for example, 
professionals, such as engineers, and 
workers express their concerns over the 
potential flood of their more qualified 
peers from other AMS.2 Elsewhere, such 
as in the Philippines and Vietnam, experts 
and business practitioners alike also warn 
the difficulty that micro-, small-, and 
medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) 
would face amidst the AEC.3 With such 
                                                          
1 The AEC Vision 2025 is part of an overarching 
ASEAN Community Vision 2025 that was adopted 
at the 27th ASEAN Summit, which took place in 
Kuala Lumpur, in November 2015. The document 
serves as a guide for ASEAN to deepen its 
economic integration post-2015.  Further details 
concerning the AEC Vision 2025 see ASEAN 
Secretariat (2015b). 
2 See, for example, Tempo (2015) and Ambarita 
(2015). 
3 See, for example, Mercurio (2015) for the 
Philippines and Anh (2015) for Vietnam 
strong domestic pressures, AMS become 
more reserved in their commitments 
towards the deepening of AEC project. 
Protectionism, however, is not 
new to Southeast Asia, with governments 
across the region employing such an 
inward-looking economic policy when 
they enjoy economic stability. On the 
other hand, major economic reforms, 
usually pursued in the form of 
deregulation and liberalisation, are 
commonly adopted when crises emerge. 
AMS’ positive attitude towards the 
deepening of ASEAN’s economic 
integration in the immediate aftermath of 
the late 1990s Asian financial crisis 
through the launching of the AEC is a 
case in point. Consistent with Jones’s 
(2015) Murdoch School of critical political-
economy approach, this article argues that 
the inclination towards protectionism in 
ASEAN be primarily rooted in the 
domestic political-economy of AMS. More 
specifically, as Jones further elaborates, 
agreements, such as the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) and the AEC, call for 
major rescaling of economic governance at 
the regional level, which affects domestic 
regulatory changes that would 
significantly redistribute power and 
resources, and ignite struggles to promote 
and constraints their effects (pp. 3-4). 
Whilst existing regional initiatives to 
address protectionism are useful, major 
crises that encourage major structural 
adjustments in all AMS might be needed 
to overcome fundamental protectionist 
inclination in the region.4 
                                                          
4 The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, for 
example, prompted ASEAN to accelerate and 
deepen its economic integration process. The AEC, 
which entails, amongst other things, indirect efforts 
to address protectionism, is a major regional 
economic reform resulted from such a process. 




In the meantime, however, the 
development of domestic consensus 
remains a key element in the deepening of 
ASEAN’s economic integration project 
(Yean and Das, 2015). In this regard, as 
Yean and Das further argue, greater 
policy coherence in domestic economies, 
increased stakeholder consultation, 
mitigation of the negative impact of AEC 
on domestic stakeholders, and the 
overcoming of resource constraint are 
primary areas that ASEAN needs to pay 
its attention to post-2015 (pp. 7-8). Aside 
from this, an effective strategy to find 
common denominators to lessen 
protectionism is also needed. Though past 
initiatives, particularly the Priority 
Integration Sectors (PIS),5 were capable of 
attaining such a goal, AMS’ half-hearted 
commitments render these initiatives 
ineffective. The new AEC Vision 2025, 
which identifies a new set of sectoral 
priorities for ASEAN, could potentially 
serve as an arena in which efforts to lessen 
protectionist measures are tested.6 
This article is divided into four 
sections. Whilst the subsequent section 
two offers overview on the existing 
literature of domestic sources of 
protectionism, the analysis in Section 
three is dedicated to showing trends and 
pattern of protectionism in ASEAN. The 
                                                          
5 Launched in 2004, PIS is an initiative aimed at 
accelerating integration in sectors that are deemed 
priority by AMS. Originally covering 11 sectors, 
including electronics, e-ASEAN, healthcare, wood-
based products, automotive, rubber-based 
products, textile and apparel, agro-based products, 
fisheries, air travel, and tourism, in 2006 logistics 
was added as the 12th PIS. 
6 The new AEC Vision 2025 identifies several key 
sectors that are deemed important to enhance 
connectivity and sectoral cooperation in the region, 
and these include: (1) transport; (2) information, 
communication, and technology (ICT); (3) e-
commerce; (4) energy; (5) food, agriculture, and 
forestry; (6) tourism; (7) healthcare; (8) minerals; 
and (9) and science and technology. 
section also briefly highlights ASEAN’s 
efforts to address protectionism, 
particularly in the area of elimination of 
NTMs/NTBs. Discussion in section four, 
meanwhile, is focused on exploring the 
domestic sources of protectionist 
inclination in ASEAN. More specifically, it 
attempts to illustrate sector/actor-specific 
struggles that affect AMS’ commitments 
towards the deepening of ASEAN 
economic integration. Furthermore, 
section five makes an argument for the 
deepening of ASEAN’s economic 
integration in advancing domestic 
reforms that could assist the dismantling 
of protectionist inclination amongst AMS. 
Finally, the article is concluded in section 
six where the author attempts to identify 
specific policy-oriented recommendations 
for consideration towards dismantling 
protectionist inclination in the region. 
Domestic sources of protectionism: A 
theoretical overview 
Protectionism is understood as a 
form of government’s policies and actions 
that restrict trade and economic openness 
in favour of the protection of local 
business and industries, which can be 
implemented through the imposition of 
tariffs, quotas, subsidies, as well as other 
forms of direct state intervention in the 
economy. Two notable arguments have 
been commonly used to promote trade 
protectionism, and these include national 
security and infant industry arguments. 
Whilst national security argument is often 
advanced with consideration of protecting 
an industry that is deemed critical to 
national security; infant industry 
argument generally calls for temporary 
protection of fledging domestic industries 
from foreign competition (Warrier, 2011, 
p. 225). Amongst all arguments 
commonly used to advance trade 
protectionism, infant industry argument 
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probably enjoys the highest attraction for 
policy-makers and economists alike, and 
this is likely to be continuously invoked 
since embryonic industries will always 
exist (Kicsi and Buta, 2010, p. 179). 
Although strong arguments have 
been made for free trade, protectionism 
continuously resurfaces in new guises 
(Gilpin, 2000). Throughout history, in fact, 
free trade has been the exception, whilst 
protectionism has been the rule (Bairoch, 
1993: 6). Indeed, if free trade is more 
efficient in comparison to trade 
protectionism, it remains puzzling as to 
why the former is not more universally 
and consistently adopted by countries 
around the world (Kaempfer et al., 2002, 
p. 2). An understanding of domestic 
political-economy of foreign economic 
policy-making can offer some 
explanations to this query. 
Few hypotheses have been 
developed to analyse the reactions of 
politico-economic actors vis-à-vis 
regionalism. One hypothesis, for example, 
focuses on the type of domestic pressure 
groups capable of pushing for 
protectionist measures in a regional trade 
liberalisation process (Hoekman and 
Leidy, 1993). Domestic industrial sectors, 
as Hoekman and Leidy further postulate, 
can be divided into two types, including 
holes and loopholes. Whilst some 
domestic actors support the protectionist 
measures attached to all domestic 
industries (also refers to ‘holes’), others 
can be satisfied with the provisions that 
allow for only temporary protection, such 
as import restrictions, import subsidies 
(also called ‘loopholes’). Other scholars, 
such as De Melo and Panagariya (1993), 
argue that the ‘preference dilution effect’ 
and the ‘preference-asymmetry effect’ 
may limit the power and the rent-seeking 
behaviour of domestic pressure groups. 
The preference dilution effect implies that 
the larger the political community, the 
less influence can be exerted by domestic 
pressure groups on the policy-making 
process. The preference asymmetry effect, 
on the other hand, allows for 
compromises on a specific issue to take 
place amongst different state actors and 
domestic pressure groups. Another set of 
arguments focuses on the formation of a 
regional integration arrangement as a 
response of policy-makers to domestic 
pressures. In Milner’s (1997, pp. 76-77) 
view, such an arrangement can be seen as 
a government’s attempt to balance 
consumer interest with the pressures that 
emerge from private economic agents, 
such as firms.  
A more recent political-economy 
analysis on the domestic consideration of 
foreign economic policy (FEP)-making is 
offered by Dent (2002). Drawing from 
seminal work of Putnam’s two-level game 
theory and assessment on the formulation 
of American FEP carried out by Ikenberry 
et al. (1988), Dent’s contesting actor-based 
influence theory maintains that the 
process of FEP formulation is usually 
contingent upon four factors, and these 
include: (1) state bureaucratic power, 
culture, and dynamics; (2) level of 
democratisation; (3) internationalisation 
of civil society; and (4) economic 
nationalism. Whilst the first condition, or 
bureaucratic state power, culture, and 
dynamics, generally occurs in a state-
centric society where constituents hold 
limited influence over FEP formulation, 
the level of democratisation in a society 
determines the extent to which domestic 
constituents can exert their influence over 
a country’s FEP. Meanwhile, the level of 
civil society’s influence over FEP is also 
dependent upon their knowledge 
regarding international political and 
economic conditions. In this regard, more 




outward-looking societies are more likely 
to assert a greater stake in the FEP 
formulation process, and vice-versa. Last 
but not least is economic nationalism, 
which acts as the source of protectionism 
in a country. In the ASEAN context, 
whilst economic nationalism and 
protectionism today have been displayed 
in AMS’s half-hearted participation in 
ASEAN economic community building, in 
the past, cases of confiscation of foreign 
assets were also common in some AMS. 
More recently, Jones (2015) offers a 
more compelling political-economic 
argument to explain the domestic root of 
protectionism in ASEAN. Using the 
Murdoch school approach,7 he argues that 
the rhetoric and reality of AEC be 
primarily rooted in the domestic political 
economy and social conflict of AMS. He 
went on to suggest that the proposed 
rescaling of economic governance at the 
regional level promotes domestic 
regulatory changes that would 
significantly redistribute power and 
resources, and this stimulates struggles 
between competing for domestic 
economic influences. Accordingly, whilst 
the domestic socio-political coalitions that 
underpin state power in Southeast Asia 
generate political imperatives for some 
level of economic openness, the same 
forces also constraint AMS to pursue full 
liberalisation at the regional level. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the rich, 
substantive, agenda of the AEC is often 
compromised by protectionist inclination 
arising from domestic alliances between 
                                                          
7 The Murdoch School tradition emerged from the 
Asia Research Centre at Murdoch University, 
Australia, which has generated numerous 
influential studies on the political-economy of 
Southeast Asia since the 1980s (see, for example, 
Robison et al. (1987), Hewison et al. (1993), and 
Rodan et al. (2006)). For further detail on this 
approach see also Hameiri and Jones (2014). 
elites in political and business spheres, 
and the broader imperatives of avoiding 
socio-political unrest that could 
accompany structural adjustments 
emerging from the AEC (pp. 3-4). 
Elsewhere, this author has also 
argued that the relationship between 
nationalism and ASEAN regionalism be 
symbiotic – the two variables can 
sometimes be mutually reinforcing, and 
sometimes mutually exclusive and 
conflicting.8 Whilst it has always been 
assumed that nationalists are opponents 
to free trade agreements (FTAs) and/or 
regional economic integration initiatives, 
they have not always been hostile to free 
trade and closer economic ties with other 
states (Shulman, 2000, p. 365). As with 
other domestic actors, nationalists, today 
have to adjust to the ongoing and intense 
pressures of globalism and regionalism. 
Incentives such as sustained economic 
development, the promotion of national 
unity, identity, and culture, the promotion 
of the state’s autonomy in international 
fora, the formation of regional collective 
action to attain regional governance, and 
the elevation of their country’s bargaining 
power at the international level are some 
of the incentives that nationalists can 
accrue from supporting initiatives such as 
the AEC.  
Pattern of protectionism in ASEAN 
Despite a commitment to open 
regionalism, the trend towards 
protectionism is increasingly common in 
ASEAN. Data made available by the 
Global Trade Alert (GTA) (n.d.)9 suggests 
                                                          
8 See, for example, Chandra (2008). 
9 The GTA is an initiative that provides real-time 
information on measures that are likely to 
discriminate against international that is 
coordinated by a London-based think-tank, the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
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that, to date, AMS still make use of 
considerable amount of measures that are 
harmful to trade. The GTA classifies trade 
measures as ‘green’, ‘amber’, and ‘red’ to 
indicate their degree of ‘harmfulness’, 
with the red classification being the most 
harmful. Amongst 630 protective 
measures that AMS adopt, 339 of them are 
classified ‘red’, whilst 182 and 109 of these 
measures are classified ‘green’ and 
‘amber’ respectively (refer to Table 1). 
With 346 measures, the majority of which, 
or 191 of them, are in ‘red’ category, 
Indonesia is the heaviest user of 
protectionist policies in the region. 
Moreover, despite the country’s recent 
aggressive moves in international trade 
negotiations, Vietnam comes second as 
the AMS commonly issuing a 
protectionist policy that is harmful to 
trade. Out of 107 measures, 60 of them are 
under ‘red’ category, whilst 29 and 18 of 
these measures are classified ‘green’ and 
‘amber’ respectively.  
Furthermore, since tariffs are 
already low (refer to Diagram 1), most 
protectionist policies in ASEAN are in the 
form of NTMs/NTBs, despite the 2007 
AEC Blueprint setting the deadlines for 
the elimination of NTBs.10 To date, as the 
ASEAN Secretariat (2015, pp. 16-17) notes 
in its ASEAN Integration Report 2015, 
though the feasibility to calculate the 
number of NTMs identified as NTBs, or 
the number of NTBs eliminated, is small, 
it is possible, however, using the 
Integrated Trade Intelligence  
Portal of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), to find the list of AMS’ notified 
                                                          
10 The AEC 2007 Blueprint deadline for the 
elimination of NTBs include: 2010 for Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Thailand; 2012 for the Philippines; 2015, with the 
flexibilities up to 2018, for Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam. 
NTMs to this global trade body (refer to 
Table 2). The same report also suggests 
that out of the total 2,178 notified NTMs, 
the largest concentration of these harmful 
trade measures is in the form of technical 
barriers to trade, which account for 1,188 
measures, followed by sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS), amounting 
to 735 measures. Ironically, however, 
many of the SPS measures are linked to 
resource-based products that are part of 
ASEAN’s PIS. 
Countries Green Amber Red Total
Brunei 
Darussalam
1 0 0 1
Cambodia 2 0 1 3
Indonesia 94 61 191 346
Lao PDR 1 0 0 1
Malaysia 16 12 24 52
Myanmar 4 1 3 8
Philippines 11 3 7 21
Singapore 9 4 21 34
Thailand 15 10 32 57
Vietnam 29 18 60 107
Total 182 109 339 630
Table 1. Harmful trade measures in ASEAN
Source: GTA (n.d.).




Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2015: 9). 
 
Table 2. ASEAN’s notified NTMs to the WTO 
 ADP CV QR SG SPS SSG TBT Total 
I F I F F I F I F F I F 
BRN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 5 
CAM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 
IND 20 15 0 0 0 10 16 53 42 0 78 14 248 
LAO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
MYS 8 19 0 0 0 2 0 27 6 0 205 6 273 
MMR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
PHL 1 0 0 0 0 4 7 119 142 7 242 1 523 
SGP 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 36 17 0 28 11 135 
THA 4 34 0 0 59 2 2 205 18 0 523 22 869 
VNM 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 43 23 0 44 7 119 
Total 33 68 0 0 102 19 26 486 249 7 1,126 62 2,178 
Note: ADP: Antidumping; CV: Countervailing; QR: Quantitative restriction; SG: 
Safeguards; SPS: Sanitary and Phytosanitary; SSG: Special safeguard; TBT: a Technical 
barrier to trade; I: Initiated; F: In force. 
Source: ASEAN Secretariat (2015: 16). 
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Source: Evenett and Fritz (2015: 72-73). 
 
Given the sheer size of its economy, 
much attention on the protectionism 
debates in the region has been given to 
Indonesia. Although the country is not 
the worst offender in the region in 
imposing new Trade-Restrictive 
regulations, it is one of the worst when it 
comes to NTMs (Patunru and Rahardja, 
2015, p. 7). While the number of 
liberalising measures adopted has 
increased from 3 in 2009 to 78 in 2015, the 
number of discriminatory policies has 
risen from 30 to 213 in the same period 
(Evenett and Fritz, 2015, pp. 72-73) (refer 
to Diagram 2). The 16th GTA Report even 
considered Indonesia as the worst 
‘offender’ for increasing protectionism 
since the global financial crisis.11 These 
NTMs, most of which imposed by the 
country’s Minister of Trade and include 
                                                          
11 In addition to NTMs imposed for trade in goods, 
the 16th GTA report in 2014 also highlights that 
Indonesia, along with the Philippines and 
Thailand, are the top three most restrictive 
countries with regard to services trade (Evenett, 
2014). 
measures such as license and permit 
requirements, pre-shipment inspections, 
and new labelling requirements, were 
often imposed to reinforce the previous 
ones, often with added strictness, whilst 
others involved complex cross-
bureaucracy between ministries. In order 
to promote domestic industries, 
Indonesia was also active in imposing 
policies, such as local content 
requirements and export restrictions, 
many of which propelled complicated 
and cumbersome business environment 
in the country (Patunru and Rahardja, 
2015, p. 7). 
Several initiatives have been 
introduced to address the issue of NTMs 
in ASEAN. As ASEAN Secretariat (2015, 
p. 16) reports, in addition to aligning and 
upgrading their NTMs database in line 
with the new NTM classification system 
of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
each AMS has also established inter-
agency bodies to strengthen coordination 




in addressing these protectionist 
measures. Other initiatives, such as the 
ASEAN Solutions for Investments, 
Service, and Trade (ASSIST), which is a 
consultative, internet-based facility that 
offers a structured mechanism for the 
private sector to lodge their complaints in 
a transparent and open manner (MITI, 
2015) and the ASEAN Trade Repository, 
an electronic interface through which the 
public can freely access the information 
available on National Trade Repositories 
of each AMS,12 are also expected to 
contribute to the elimination of various 
protectionist measures in ASEAN. 
Domestic sources of protectionism in 
ASEAN 
By and large, the economies of 
Southeast Asia display mixed economic 
regimes that accommodate economic 
openness, market mechanism, and 
multilateralism in trade policy, on the 
one hand, and state-driven models and 
interventionist practices, on the other 
(Nesadurai, 2012, p. 18). Despite their 
ambitious content, present regional 
economic integration initiatives of 
ASEAN, such as the AEC, remain 
shallow in reality. As Dosch (2015, p. 3) 
rightly points out, the AEC reflects the 
same hesitant pattern that was evident in 
previous ASEAN’s economic integration 
ventures, such as the ASEAN Preferential 
Trade Arrangement (APTA) and AFTA. 
Indeed, as highlighted in the previous 
section three, although, on the positive 
side, the Association has managed to 
reduce Member States’ tariff level to a 
considerable degree, protectionism is 
creeping in by way of NTMs/NTBs. 
                                                          
12 Further detail about the ASEAN Trade 
Repository is available in its official website at 
(accessed 24th January 2016): http://atr.asean.org/. 
There is little doubt, however, 
that protectionism in ASEAN is mainly 
rooted in the domestic political-economy 
of its AMS. Whilst regional economic 
integration projects are often argued as 
rational responses to globalisation and 
growing international competition, in 
Southeast Asian context, they are most 
and foremost political projects that are 
generated and promoted by specific 
social and political forces and contested 
by those threatened by the so-called ‘neo-
liberal’ restructuring and adjustments 
(Jayasuriya, 2003). Notwithstanding 
diversity in the state-society relations 
across different AMS, two common 
features can be found in the region, 
including the central role played by the 
economy in politics and the intricate 
linkages between the state, political 
actors, and politically influential 
domestic social forces, particularly 
corporate sectors, that is embedded 
within the so-called patronage networks 
(Nesadurai, 2014, p. 228). 
Business-state relations deserve 
particular attention in this regard. As 
Jones (2015, p. 7) argues, the 
development trajectories that have been 
developed in Southeast Asia have created 
forms of state power that are amenable to 
the interests of these non-state actors. The 
long process, developed throughout the 
Cold War period, of the state-led 
development process that was backed by 
Western governments, donor agencies, 
and international financial institutions 
has cultivated the symbiotic relationship 
between political bureaucracy and 
business groups, whilst marginalising 
opposition groups (Rodan et al., 2006). In 
Indonesia, for instance, the then 
Suharto’s regime exchanged protection to 
ethnic-Chinese business elite for 
economic support to advance the 
interests of the regime (Robison, 1986), 
10                                                            
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whilst, subsequently, the surviving 
oligarchs in the post-Suharto era, along 
with other provincial politico-business 
elites, reorganised themselves to 
dominate the country’s new democratic 
and decentralised political institution 
through money politics and clientelist 
networks (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). The 
same also applies to other ASEAN 
countries, including Malaysia (where the 
ruling UMNO has actively cultivated 
support for Malay business elite in return 
for financial support),13 the Philippines 
(where landed oligarchs and crony 
capitalists cultivated under the Marcos 
regime remain in control of the country’s 
democratic elites),14 and Thailand (where 
politico-business elites that have been 
cultivated under successive military 
regimes were able to dominate Thai 
politics in the late 1980s and were always 
in competition for office thereafter).15 
Whilst these domestic 
circumstances present significant 
challenges to AMS’ intention to pursue 
active engagement in international fora, 
this does not mean reforms and 
liberalisations have not taken place. Tariff 
liberalisation, as mentioned elsewhere in 
this article, has been relatively successful, 
whilst the level of ASEAN’s economic 
integration has arguably been deepened, 
albeit slowly. As in the case with its past 
economic integration projects, the degree 
of liberalisation achieved in ASEAN is 
reflective of the outcome of struggles 
between liberalising reformers, who 
emphasised the general welfare gains 
offered by greater international economic 
openness, and their opponents, who 
sought to maintain specific, national-scale 
protections benefiting themselves and 
                                                          
13 See, for example, Gomez and Jomo (1997). 
14 See, for example, Hutchison (2006). 
15 See, for example, Pasuk and Baker (2004). 
their allies (Nesadurai, 2003). Whilst this 
struggle generate substantial 
deregulation, with the average import 
tariffs, fell from 12.3 percent in the early 
1990s to 1.5 percent by mid-2006 (Hill 
and Menon, 2010, pp. 7-8), many of the 
highly politically sensitive sectors 
remained protected (Jones, 2015, p. 12). 
At the onset of AFTA implementation, 
for example, over two-thirds of 
agricultural products were excluded from 
the Common Effective Preferential 
Scheme (CEPT).  
More importantly, however, 
when their business interests are 
challenged by regional economic 
integration initiatives, such as AFTA, 
business actors were able to overturn 
specific policy decisions through their 
connection with the ruling elite 
(Nesadurai, 2003, p. 122). Such 
circumstances often spark frictions 
amongst AMS. For example, the 
reduction of import tariff under AFTA 
has enabled Japanese firms to consolidate 
their production in Thailand. Whilst this 
vastly improved the automotive industry 
of Thailand, the automotive sectors in 
Malaysia were severely hit, and this 
generated severe anti-AFTA resistance 
amongst the country’s politically 
connected producers (Wad, 2009, pp. 175-
178). Elsewhere in the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS), Glassman (2010) also 
argues that, instead of facilitating the 
deepening of the GMS, this sub-regional 
initiative has, by and large, been used as 
a platform for Thai and Chinese capitals 
to serve the Southeast Asian region and 
beyond. 
Protectionism, however, has been 
more profound since the emergence of 
2008/09 global financial crisis (GFC). 
Although many of the Southeast Asian 
economies were not heavily invested in 




the type of toxic assets that exposed 
owners to deep losses in the West, the 
GFC, nevertheless, affected the 
economies of the region through trade 
and financial channels, reflecting the 
region’s deep economic integration with 
the rest of the world (Plummer, 2009, pp. 
1-2). Although ASEAN leaders were 
quick to issue a statement that 
emphasised the region’s stance on anti-
protectionism (McDermid, 2009),16 the 
prolonged impacts of the GFC encourage 
AMS to resort eventually to protectionist 
measures. 
The protectionist inclination is 
particularly alarming in the largest 
economy of ASEAN, or Indonesia. Whilst 
much attention has been given to the 
present administration of President Joko 
Widodo, the trend towards protectionism 
was already visible in the second term of 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
administration (2009-2014). At the time, 
not only that the country saw a 
significant increase of NTMs to limit 
imports and exports, but it was also 
amongst the large and emerging 
economies that used this protectionist 
tool extensively to protect its domestic 
industry (Oliver, 2012). Whilst past 
economic crises were able to generate 
‘good policies’, during the present 
economic hardship, however, Indonesia 
is more inclined towards making ‘bad’ 
economic policies, including protectionist 
measures and various inward-looking 
policies (Patunru and Rahardja, 2015). 
Aside from deteriorating domestic 
economic condition that has been fuelled 
by prolonged global economic 
slowdown, slow exports, and weak 
household confidence and consumption, 
rising nationalism, driven by various 
                                                          
16 See, for example, ASEAN Leaders’ statement at the 
14th ASEAN Summit that took place in Hua Hin, 
Thailand, in 2009. 
political parties and business groups, also 
gives room for protectionist policy to 
exist (Negara, 2015, pp. 4-6). 
The push for protectionism is also 
evident in other ASEAN countries. In 
Malaysia, for example, aside from its 
long-standing New Economic Policy, 
which is dubbed by some as 
discriminatory and protectionist,17 the 
country’s automotive sector remains one 
of the most protected ones in the region. 
The sector was only liberalised as late as 
2004 under AFTA since the industry was 
considered as a key import substitution 
project designed to generate a Malay 
capitalist class (Jones, 2015, p. 12). Until 
more recently, however, Malaysia’s 
automotive sector remains protected 
from foreign competition through the 
elaborate construction of tariff barriers, 
investment-approval permits, differential 
excise taxes, subsidised credit, 
procurement arrangement, and tax 
allowances (Nehru, 2012).18 In the 
Philippines, meanwhile, the country’s 
investment climate has been hampered 
by its 1987 constitution that supports 
laws restricting foreign ownership of 
property to 40 percent (Article XII) 
(Tacujan, 2013), whilst Presidential 
Decree No. 1466, which prohibits 
government cargoes to be transported by 
non-Philippines flagged ships, also 
restricts the country’s regional economic 
integration commitments.19 Similarly, in 
Vietnam, the country’s steel sector lobby 
                                                          
17 See, for example, the comment made by the 
former Envoy of the European Commission to 
Malaysia, Thierry Rommel, as quoted in Netto 
(2007). 
18 Despite this, as Nehru (2012) further explains, 
the share of the main automotive producer of 
Malaysia, or Proton, has been declining, with the 
company now utilises only 45 percent of its 
capacity and is steadily losing ground to other 
domestic and international competitors. 
19 As quoted in Port Calls Asia (2014). 
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group has recently called for greater 
protection amidst challenges of weak 
domestic demand and, at the same time, 
dirt-cheap steel imports from China.20 
Around the same time, state-owned 
PetroVietnam also asked the government 
to limit fuel imports and take measures to 
do local businesses to use products from 
its two oil refineries.21  
From a sectoral perspective, 
protectionism is merely a result of sector-
specific struggles for powers and 
resources within ASEAN societies. In an 
extensive analysis on the professional 
migration in ASEAN, Sumano (2013: 151-
204) argues that, in Thailand, the 
country’s medical council was dominated 
by scarce, and, consequently, well-paid 
local doctors who feared competition 
from their peer abroad. In view of 
potential salary reduction, employers of 
these local doctors, both private and 
public hospitals, were expected to favour 
liberalisation in the sector. It turned out. 
However, public hospitals were divided, 
between those in the rural areas where 
medical professionals were scarce, and 
those in the urban areas where such 
professionals were plenty. In the 
meantime, private hospitals continued to 
lure medical professionals from public 
institutions with higher salaries. 
Accordingly, employers in the sector 
were hardly ever unified behind a 
strongly pro-liberalisation stance, with 
the Thai Medical Council insisted the 
country maintain qualifying 
examinations in Thai, a de facto NTB 
(Jones, 2015, p. 18).  
Similar circumstances also occur 
in Indonesia. Recently, for instance, the 
Indonesian Medical Association 
                                                          
20 As reported by the Vietnamnet (2015). 
21 As reported by the Thanh Nien News (2015). 
expressed their disagreement towards 
liberalisation trade practices of the AEC. 
It argued that public health matters 
should not be left to the market 
mechanism (Bisnis Indonesia, 2016). In 
the public, the opinions are divided. A 
commentary in The Jakarta Post argued, 
for example, that Indonesian medical 
services in the country need to be 
improved, whilst attitude of local 
medical professionals need to be changed 
so as to allow better treatments for the 
patients. At the end of the day, as the 
author of this commentary opines, ‘local 
physicians would only have themselves 
to blame if customers shift to foreign 
physicians’.22  
Can the deepening of the regional 
economic integration address chronic 
problem of protectionism in ASEAN? 
Can the deepening of ASEAN 
integration serve as a tool to promote 
economic reforms and, thereby, 
dismantle protectionist inclination 
amongst countries in Southeast Asia? 
This is certainly the expectation amongst 
policy-makers and intellectual elite in the 
region. In the past, the Association’s 
regional economic integration initiatives, 
particularly AFTA, were seen by many as 
a ‘training ground’ where AMS could 
learn to compete with one another before 
they compete elsewhere in the global 
market place.23 Many of these initiatives 
looked at ways in which ASEAN could 
become more competitive, and this 
entailed, inter alia, the removal of tariffs 
as much as NTMs/NTBs. 
Recent literature, however, show 
a rather pessimistic view about the role 
that regionalism can play in dismantling 
protectionism. Štĕrbovă (2008), for 
                                                          
22 See Dharmawan (2014). 
23 See, for example, Ariff (1993). 




instance, argues that, over the years, 
regional integration has lost its historical 
role in supporting global trade 
liberalisation, and has, in fact, become a 
crucial obstacle to it. Aside from bringing 
the protectionist element into the legal 
aspect of the multilateral trading system, 
the increasing intervention of global 
trade negotiations into domestic policies, 
such as in the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property rights, 
government procurement, administrative 
procedures, and so on, is making 
countries more inclined to pursue 
protectionist policies. Along similar line 
of argument, Abida (2013) also maintains 
that, by creating preferential rules that 
are inconsistent with the principles of the 
WTO, regional integration strategy can 
create trade diversion, and increase the 
risk of trade disputes with third party 
countries that can generate a commercial 
environment that is full of threats and 
reprisals.  
Fortunately, this is not the case 
with ASEAN. Given their vast economic 
dependence with non-ASEAN 
economies, AMS see the value in 
involving themselves actively in 
multilateral trade negotiations, and have, 
therefore, consistently extended their 
continuous support for the conclusion of 
the WTO’s long-standing Doha round of 
negotiations. It is also part of the reasons 
why ASEAN’s trade agenda has been 
expanded over the years to include 
bilateral free trade agreements and/or 
comprehensive economic partnership 
with its key Dialogue Partners, and, more 
recently, the negotiations to create a 
Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP).24 
                                                          
24 Launched at the 21st ASEAN and Related 
Summits in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2012, 
RCEP is a free trade agreement currently being 
negotiated between ASEAN and its six Dialogue 
More importantly, if properly 
adhered to, ASEAN’s economic 
integration initiatives possess the 
potential to advance domestic reforms 
that could assist the dismantling of 
uncompetitive, rent-seeking, behaviour 
that paves the way for protectionist 
inclination in AMS. As widely argued by 
regionalism advocates, regional economic 
integration could propel domestic 
reforms that would enable governments 
to pursue policies that are welfare-
improving, but incapable to do so in the 
absence of such a regional set-up.25 
Unlike engagement made at the 
multilateral and/or bilateral level, which, 
as mentioned earlier, governments can 
find extremely intrusive towards their 
development agenda, the pace and 
development of ASEAN economic 
integration agenda have been built and 
designed to suit the development 
capacity of its member countries. Though 
this in itself is an apparent half-hearted 
commitment towards economic 
integration amongst state apparatuses in 
ASEAN, regional economic integration 
provides a more logical option for 
countries that wish to maintain status 
quo, on the one hand and pursue gradual 
economic reforms, on the other. 
Given the emerging support for 
economic nationalism and protectionism 
in the region, however, ASEAN is in dire 
need to truly self-reflect on its 
                                                                                  
Partners with which the Association already has 
individual FTAs with. When and if completed, 
RCEP will make up 45 percent of the world 
population, and contribute a third of the world’s 
GDP. Whist initially planned to be completed by 
the end of 2016, it is understood that the new 
schedule for additional negotiating rounds in 2017 
has been set to further discuss sticking points in 
the negotiations. For further information on RCEP, 
see, for example, Ministry of Trade and Industry of 
Singapore (n.d.).  
25 See, for example, Niekerk (2005). 
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achievement to date. Aside from 
communicating better its economic 
integration policies to the public, the 
Association also is in need of a better 
approach in amplifying the message that 
protectionism benefits the few, and 
harms the masses. At the same time, the 
public also needs convincing of the fact 
that the unwillingness of state 
apparatuses to distant themselves away 
from influential rent-seekers, which are 
often dominated by powerful business 
interests, keeps them away from potential 
benefits that ASEAN economic 
integration promises. 
Concluding remarks 
Despite its ambitious AEC project, 
protectionism is on the rise throughout 
ASEAN. Protectionism, however, is not 
new to Southeast Asia, with governments 
across the region employing such an 
inward-looking economic policy when 
they enjoy economic stability, and pursue 
reforms when confronted with major 
economic challenges. Unfortunately, 
embryonic industries will always exist in 
the region, and governments will find 
excuses to safeguard their existence. With 
the major decline in tariff lines, AMS can 
be expected to make use continuously of 
NTMs/NTBs to serve such a protectionist 
purpose.  
Whilst it is difficult to predict the 
occurrence of the next crises, and 
whether ‘good’ policies could, indeed, 
emerge from such a catastrophic event, it 
is possible, however, to take gradual 
steps to eventually lessen the use of 
protectionist measures. About 
NTMs/NTBs, for example, there is a merit 
of considering incorporating efforts to 
eliminate these barriers in regulatory-
reform agendas of each AMS, and 
improve information-sharing and 
technical cooperation on the issue 
amongst AMS (Cadot et al., 2013, p. 2). 
Another potential approach is to identify 
common denominator to lessen 
protectionism. Whilst initiative, such as 
ASEAN Trade Repository and the 
ASEAN Solutions for Investments, 
Services, and Trade (ASSIST) may pave 
the way for eventual elimination of 
NTMs/NTBs, priorities on the elimination 
of these measures can be focused, for 
example, on the existing and new priority 
integration sectors ASEAN. In the 
meantime, however, the attainment of 
domestic consensus, developed through 
greater policy coherence and extensive 
stakeholder consultations, will prove to 
be a critical ingredient in overcoming 
protectionism, on the one hand, and 
instilling popular support for ASEAN 
economic integration, on the other.  
About Author 
Alexander C. Chandra is an 
Associate Fellow of the ASEAN Studies 
Program, The Habibie Center. He was 
former Executive Director of the ASEAN 
Business Advisory Council (ASEAN 
BAC). Prior to joining the ASEAN BAC, 
he was the Regional Coordinator for 
Trade Knowledge Network (TKN) 
Southeast Asia. He holds a Ph.D. in 
Southeast Asian Studies from the 
University of Hull, UK. His key interests 
are political economy of Southeast and 
East Asian regionalism, international 
trade, democratic governance and the 
role of the civil society in policy-making. 
References 
Abida, M. (2013), ‘The Regional 
Integration Agreements: A New 
Face of Protectionism’, 
International Journal of Economics 




and Finance, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 183-
195. 
Ambarita, R. (2015), ‘Pekerja Indonesia 
Belum Siap Hadapi MEA 
(Indonesian Workers are not 
Ready in Facing the AEC)’, Sinar 
Harapan, 14th September, available 





Anh, H. (2015), ‘Most Vietnamese 
Companies Still Not Ready for 
ASEAN Economic Community’, 
Vietnam Investment Review, 29th 
January, available online at 





Ariff, M. (1993), ‘AFTA = Another Futile 
Trade Area?, in S. Siddique and S. 
Kumar, eds., The 2nd ASEAN 
Reader, Singapore: ISEAS, pp. 226-
229. 
ASEAN Secretariat (2015a), ASEAN 
Integration Report 2015, Jakarta: 
ASEAN Integration Monitoring 
Office, the ASEAN Secretariat. 
_____ (2015b), ASEAN Community Vision 
2025, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 






Anukoonwattaka, W., and A. Heal (2014), 
Regional Integration and Labour 
Mobility, Bangkok: UNESCAP. 
Bairoch, P. (1993), Economics and World 
History: Myths and Paradoxes, New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Bisnis Indonesia (2016), ‘Tenaga 
Kesehatan: Antara MEA dan 
Sentimen Asing (Medical 
Professionals: Between the AEC 
and Anti-Foreign Sentiment’, 21st 
January, available online at 





Cadot, O., E. Munadi, and L. Y. Ing 
(2013), Streamlining NTMs in 
ASEAN: The Way Forward, ERIA 
Discussion Paper Series: ERIA-
DP-2013-24, Jakarta: Economic 
Research Institute of ASEAN and 
East Asia (ERIA). 
Chandra, A. C. (2008), Indonesia and the 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: 
Nationalists and Regional 
Integration Strategy, Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books. 
De Melo, J., and A. Panagariya, eds. 
(1993), New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Dent, C. M. (2002), The Foreign Economic 
Policies of Singapore, South Korea, 
and Taiwan, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd. 
Dharmawan, T. (2014), ‘Are Indonesian 
Physicians Ready for ASEAN 
Economic Community?’, The 
Jakarta Post, 6th December, 




16                                                            
 
Regional Economic Community in ASEAN 
indonesian-physicians-ready-
asean-economic-community.html 
Evenett, S. J. (2014), The Global Trade 
Disorder – The 16th GTA Report, 
London: CEPR. 
Evenett, S. J., and J. Fritz (2015), The Tide 
Turns? Trade, Protectionism, and 
Slowing Global Growth – 18th 
Global Trade Alert Report, London: 
CEPR. 
Gilpin, R. (2000), The Challenge of Global 
Capitalism: The World Economy in 
the 21st Century, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Glassman, J. (2010), Bounding the Mekong: 
The Asian Development Bank, China, 
and Thailand, Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press. 
Global Trade Alert (n.d.), ‘Site Statistics’, 




Gomez, E. T., and K. S. Jomo (1997), 
Malaysia’s Political Economy: 
Politics, Patronage and Profits, 
Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hameiri, S., and L. Jones (2014), Murdoch 
International: The ‘Murdoch School’ 
in International Relations, Asia 
Research Centre Working Paper 
No. 178, December, available 




Hewison, K., R. Robison, and G. Rodan, 
eds. (1993), Southeast Asia in the 
1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy 
and Capitalism, St. Leonards: Allen 
and Unwin. 
Hoekman, B., and M. Leidy (1993), ‘Holes 
and Loopholes in Integration 
Agreements: History and 
Prospects’, in K. Anderson and R. 
Blackhurst, eds., Regional 
Integration and the Global Trading 
System, New York, NY and 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
pp. 218-245. 
Hutchison, J. (2006), ‘Poverty of Politics 
in the Philippines’i G. Rodan et al., 
eds., The Political Econoy of 
Southeast Asia: Markets, Power and 
Contestation, 3rd ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 39-
73. 
Ikenberry, G. J., D. A. Lake, and M. 
Mastanduno, eds. (1988), 
‘Introduction: Approaches to 
Explaining American Foreign 
Economic Policy’, in G. J. 
Ikenberry et al., eds., The State and 
American Foreign Economic Policy, 
Cambridge, MA: Cornell 
University Press, pp. 1-14. 
Jayasuriya, K. (2003), ‘Embedded 
Mercantilism and Open 
Regionalism: The Crisis of a 
Regional Political Project’, Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 
339-55. 
Jones, L. (2015), ‘Explaining the Failure of 
the ASEAN Economic 
Community: The Primacy of 
Domestic Political-Economy’, The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 19, pp. 1-24. 
Kaempfer, W. H., E. Tower, and T. D. 
Willet (2002), ‘Trade 
Protectionism’, available online at 




(accessed 20th January 2016): 
http://public.econ.duke.edu/Paper
s//Other/Tower/Protectionism.pdf 
Kicsi, R., and S. Buta (2010), 
‘Protectionism and ‚Infant‛ 
Industries: Theoretical 
Approaches’, Economics and 
Applied Informatics, Years: XVI, 
No. 1, pp. 173-180. 
Kritzinger-van Niekerk, L. (2005), 
Regional Integration: Concepts, 
Advantages, Disadvantages and 
Lessons of Experience, Washington, 
D.C.: World Bank, available 




McDermid, C. (2009), ‘Protectionism a 
Dirty ASEAN Word’, Asia Times 
Online, 3rd March, available online 
at (accessed 22nd January 2016): 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/So
utheast_Asia/KC03Ae02.html 
Mercurio, R. S. (2015), ‘Philippines Not 
Ready For ASEAN Integration’, 
The Star, 3rd November, available 





Milner, H. V. (1997), ‘Industries, 
Governments, and the Creation of 
Regional Trade Blocs’, in E. D. 
Mansfield and H. V. Milner, eds., 
The Political Economy of 
Regionalism, New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 
77-106. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry of 
Singapore (n.d.), What You Need 
To Know about Regional 
Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership, available online at 







MITI – Malaysian Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (2015), ‘Media 
Release: 47th ASEAN Economic 
Ministers’ Meeting’, 24th August, 




Negara, S. D. (2015), ‘Rising Economic 
Nationalism in Indonesia: Will 
This Time Be Different?’, ISEAS 
Yusof Ishak Institute Perspective, 
No. 59, 20th October. 
Nehru, V. (2012), ‘Malaysia: Time to 
Liberalise Its Automobile Sector’, 
East Asia Forum, 13 March, 





Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2003), Globalisation, 
Domestic Politics, and Regionalism: 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area, 
London: Routledge. 
_____ (2012), ‘The Political Economy of 
Southeast Asia’s Foreign 
Economic Policies and Relations’, 
in S. Pekkane, J. Ravenhill, and R. 
Foot, eds., The Oxford Handbok of 
the International Relations of Asia, 
Oxford and New York, NY: 
18                                                            
 
Regional Economic Community in ASEAN 
Oxford University Press, pp. 217-
240. 
_____ (2014), ‘Trade Policy in Southeast 
Asia: Politics, Domestic Interests, 
and the Forging of New 
Accommodations in Regional and 
Global Economy’, in R. Robison, 
ed., Routledge Handbook of 
Southeast Asian Politics, London: 
Routledge, pp. 315-329. 
Netto, A. (2007), ‘Race-Based Policy 
Spoils EU-Malaysian Ties’, Asia 
Times Online, 29th June, available 




Oliver, J. (2012), ‘Rise of Non-Tariff 
Protection Amid Global 
Uncertainty’, The World Bank’s 
Growth and Crisis Blog, 31st 
January, available online at 




Pasuk, P., and C. Baker (2004), Thaksin: 
The Business of Politics in Thailand, 
Copenhagen: NIAS. 
Patunru, A. A., and S. Rahardja (2015), 
‘Trade Protectionism in Indonesia: 
Bad Times and Bad Policy’, Lowy 
Institute Analysis, July, available 





Plummer, M. G. (2009), The Global 
Economic Crisis and Its Implications 
for Asian Economic Cooperation, 
Honolulu, Hawaii: The East-West 
Center. 
Port Calls Asia (2014), ‘PH Foreign Equity 
Rule, Cabotage Barriers to 
ASEAN Integration’, 8th July, 





Putnam, D. (1988), ‘Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of 
Two-Level Games’, International 
Organization, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 
427-459. 
Robison, R. (1986), Indonesia: The Rise of 
Capital, Sydney: Allen and Unwin. 
_____, K. Hewison, and R. Higgot, eds. 
(1987), Southeast Asia in the 1980s: 
The Politics of Economic Crisis, 
London: Allen and Unwin. 
_____ and V. R. Hadiz (2004), 
Reorganising Power in Indonesia: 
The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of 
Markets, New York, NY: 
Routledge Curzon. 
Rodan, G., K. Hewison, and R. Robison, 
eds. (2006), The Political Economy of 
Southeast Asia: Markets, Power, and 
Contestation, 3rd ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Shulman, S. (2000), ‘Nationalist Sources 
of International Economic 
Integration’, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 365-
390. 
Štĕrbovă, L. (2008), Regional Integration: A 
New Trade Protectionism, available 
online at (accessed 21st July 
2016):http://www.gcasa.com/PDF/







Sumano, B. (2013), ‘Explaining the 
Liberalisation of Professional 
Migration in ASEAN’, Ph.D. 
thesis, School of Politics and 
International Relations, Queens 
Mary, University of London, 
London. 
Tacujan, P. (2013), ‘Protectionist Clauses 
in the Philippine Constitution 
Restrict the Flow of Foreign Direct 
Investment’, The Philippine Star, 3rd 






Tempo (2015), ‘Insinyur Indonesia Dinilai 
Belum Siap Hadapi MEA 
(Indonesian Engineers Are Not 
Ready in Facing the AEC)’, 11th 
December, available online at 





Thanh Nien News (2015), ‘PetroVietnam 
Calls for Protectionism, Says 
Cheap Imports Will Hurt Local 
Refineries’, 17th September, 
available online at (accessed on 






Vietnamnet (2014), ‘Steel Sector Wants 
Longer Protectionism’, 8th 
November, available online at 




Yean, T. S., and S. B. Das (2015), 
‘Domestic Consensus Vital for 
ASEAN Economic Community 
Beyond 2015’, ISEAS Yosuf Ishak 
Istitute Perspective, No. 50, 14th 
September. 
Wad, P. (2009), ‘The Automobile Industry 
of Southeast Asia: Malaysia and 
Thailand’, Journal of the Asia Pacifc 
Economy, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 172-
93. 
Warrier, E. (2011), ‘A-Z Glossary’, in E. 
Warrier, ed., The Politics of Fair 
Trade: A Survey, London and New 
York: Routledge, pp. 131-246. 
 
